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BURDENS OF PERSUASION: 
BURDENED BY TOO MANY BURDENS 
By Marvin B. Steinberg· 
I
magine this scene: You have just delivered the best 
closing argument in your trial career. The jury 
deliberates for no longer than 20 minutes. The 
foreperson announces a large verdict in favor of your 
client; but, suddenly, before the foreperson can sit down, 
the judge calls counsel to the bench: "I am disappointed 
with the verdict this jury has returned Clearly, the weight 
of the evidence was against the verdict of the jury. Viewing 
all evidence and inferences in favor of the plaintiff, a 
reasonable person could not return with a verdict in the 
plaintiff's favor. Consequently, the verdict is vacated and 
the case dismissed." 
While this happens infrequently, it illustrates that suc-
cess at a trial depends upon the moving party's ability to 
meet its burden of persuasion to the satisfaction ofthe jury 
and the judge. While no two trials are alike, all cases have 
a specific degree of persuasion which must be satisfied. 
Before becoming a judge, 1 never attempted to differen-
tiate among the various degrees of persuasion. Instead, I 
simply made out the best possible case for my client and 
then argued that the result met the applicable burden. This 
method of advocacy seemed to work best considering the 
numerous types of persuasion burdens. 
It was not until I became a judge and had to act as the 
finder offact, that it became apparent that it was impossible 
to distinguish among the various burdens with any degree 
of assurance. Therefore, I thought it would be helpful to 
collect the different burdens and place them in a relative 
order of what I thought would be a neat, well organized, 
precisely graduated list of ascending requirements of easily 
determined degrees of persuasion. Much to my dismay, 
however, the list turned into a quagmire of phrases without 
solid underpinnings and defined boundaries, a paradigm in 
form, but an undefined mass in substance. 
Undaunted by my personal reaction and resulting doubt, 
I ploughed ahead with the research (or at least pushed on 
my law clerks). After much research, reading, and revi-
sion, I came across a law review article entitled: "Burdens 
of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or 
Constitutional Guarantees?"2 I heartily recommend it to all 
judges and lawyers. While that treatise adequately ad-
dressed my concerns, I felt that a brief article, confining 
itselfto Maryland cases, would be of benefit to the bench 
and bar. Dealing with the burdens of proof as a judge, I now 
realize the importance, to trial lawyers, oftheir being able to 
articulate the differences in their arguments to the judge as 
well as the jury. 
Burden of proo/refers to that party who has the obliga-
tion of convincing the trier of fact of the truth of the facts as 
alleged. The burden of persuasion, on the other hand, refers 
to the various degrees of belief which a fact finder must 
reach to deem facts to be true.) For example, in a criminal 
case the burden of proof is on the government. The 
government's burden of persuasion is to prove the neces-
sary elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 
The appropriate burden of persuasion is dictated by 
either the substantive law of the case, or by the procedural 
posture of the case. The latter occurs when the trial court 
acts in an appellate capacity, such as when hearing excep-
tions from a Master's findings,S sitting in an en banc panel,6 
or hearing appeals from a lower court' or administrative 
agency. 8 
This article will: (1) identify the various burdens of 
persuasion used by Maryland's trial and appellate courts; (2) 
illustrate the differences among those burdens; and, (3) 
suggest a reduction in the number of different kinds of 
burdens used so that the confusion among them is reduced. 
I. TRIAL BURDENS DEFINED 
At the trial level, there are three primary burdens of 
persuasion: (1) preponderance of the evidence; (2) clear and 
convincing evidence; and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Substantive law dictates which burden is appropriate. Gen-
erally, the ''preponderance of the evidence" standard is used 
in civil cases. The more stringent ''beyond a reasonable 
doubf' standard is applied in criminal proceedings. A 
middle ground of "clear and convincing evidence" is used in 
a variety of cases as a result of common-law or statute. An 
example of the former is a civil case where fraud is alleged.1I 
An example ofthe latter is a case involving the involuntary 
termination of parental rights.10 In addition to these three 
primary burdens, there are a number of other burdens the 
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courts employ: probable cause to believe; reasonable 
cause to believe; and reasonable suspicion, to name a few. 11 
These burdens will be addressed later in this article.12 
Choosing the proper burden should be a mechanical 
function; difficulties arise, however, in deciding if the 
burden has been met. This problem occurs when judges 
and juries fail to appreciate the distinctions between the 
various burdens. 
A. Preponderance of the evidence. 
In addition to the traditional tort and contract cases, 
there are other civil matters where the prepondeI3Dce 
burden is appropriate. Among such cases are civil con-
tempt proceedingsll and those equity matters such as 
paternity,I4 divorcels and proceedings seeking to sustain a 
forfeiture of property. 16 PrepondeI3Dce of the evidence is 
also applied in various "internal findings" in criminal cases 
for juvenile waiver,11 admissibility of a defendant's con-
fession or statements,I8 proof of affirmative defenses, and 
evidence of mitigating factors in death penalty cases. 19 
The prepondeI3Dce of 
the evidence standard 
relevant to a fair defense;26 using the sealed container 
defense in product liability litigation;27 fraud;28 attorney 
discipline actions before the attorney grievance commis-
sion;29 and involuntary civil commitment proceedings.30 
The most recently added forum for this burden is when 
punitive damages are claimed in products liability cases,31 
C. Beyond a reasonable doubt 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the appropriate 
burden of persuasion in criminal cases,32 juvenile delin-
quency cases,33 and in determining the existence ofaggra-
vating circumstances in death penalty cases. 34 InMontgom-
eryv. State,35 the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed a trial 
judge's jury instructions and described a proper instruction 
for beyond a reasonable doubt: 
That doesn't mean, however, that the State must 
prove those elements of a crime to an absolute or 
mathematical certainty. It means such evidence as 
you would act upon in a matter involving important 
affairs in your life or your business or with regard to 
your property. If the 
evidence is sufficient 
requires evidence which: 
(I) is sufficiently strong 
to establish that a fact is 
"more likely true than not 
true"; or "more probable 
than not"; (2) ''tips the 
scale ever so lightly in 
the favor of [the party 
"The appropriate burden of per sua-
sion is dictated by either the substan-
tive law of the case, or by the proce-
dural posture of the case." 
that you would act 
upon it in a very im-
portant matter in your 
own lives then it is 
sufficient to convict 
in a criminal case.36 
In the case of Wills v. 
who bears the burden of 
persuasion],,; (3) has the "greater weighf'; or (4) amounts 
to at least 51 percent of the evidence.2o The Mal)'land Civil 
Pattern Jury instructions state: 
[t]o prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
means to prove that something is more likely so 
than not so. In other words, a prepondeI3Dce of 
the evidence means such evidence as, when con-
sidered and compared with that opposed to it, has 
more convincing force and produces in your 
minds a beliefthat it is more likely true than not 
true. 2 I 
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Clear and convincing evidence is more than a prep on-
deI3Dce of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 22 The Maryland Civil Pattern Jury 
Instructions state: "[t]o be clear and convincing, evidence 
should be 'clear' in the sense that it is certain, plain to the 
understanding, and unambiguous and 'convincing' in the 
sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you 
to believe it.'>23 
Clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate bur-
den to apply, inter alia: in setting aside a release;24 estab-
lishing constructive trusts;2S the state's rebuttal to an 
allegation that an informer'S identity is necesSaI)' and 
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State,37 the court of ap-
peals made it very clear 
that while no specific language is mandated, the preferred 
instruction as to reasonable doubt should follow the Mal)'-
land Civil Pattern Jury Instructions. 
II. APPELLATE BURDENS DEFINED 
At the appellate level, there are primarily two standards 
used to review the actions of a trial court, substantial 
evidence and clearly erroneous. These appellate standards 
are binding on a trial court when it is sitting as an appellate 
court, such as when hearing an appeal from the district 
court, hearing an administrative appeal, or hearing excep-
tions to the findings ofa master.38 
A. Substantial Evidence 
In all appeals, generally, and in administrative appeals 
specifically, the reviewing court will not disturb the facts as 
found by the initial fact finder if supported by substantial, 
competent and material evidence when the record is viewed 
as a whole.39 Moreover, when dealing with an appeal from 
an administrative agency, the court of appeals requires that 
the agency's decision be reviewed in the light most favor-
able to the agency, and that the court not infringe upon 
judgments within the presumed expertise ofthe administra-
tive agency.40 Clearly, this situation must be distinguished 
from that presented by a de novo appeal. In such a case, the 
"appellate court" acts as a fact finder and owes no deference 
to the administrative agency. A de novo trial, in essence, is 
a new trial. 
In Newell v. Richards,41 the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land distinguished the appropriate difference in procedures 
between appeals from the Health Claims Arbitration Office 
for medical malpractice claims and those appeals from the 
Workers' Compensation Commission. In an appeal from 
the Health Claims Arbitration Office, the judge shall in-
struct the jury that while the decision of an arbitration panel 
is presumed to be correct, the plaintiff (Le., the claimant), 
whether successful or not before the arbitration office still 
has the burden of proving his or her case by a preponderance 
of the evidence.42 "In workers' compensation cases, who-
. ever takes the appeal, whether claimant or employer/in-
surer, has the burden of proving its case by a preponderance 
of the evidence and becomes the "plaintiff' while the 
appellee becomes the "defendant.'043 The two types of 
appeals are treated differently because the medical malprac-
tice appeal arises from a common law tort cause of action, 
but workers' compensation cases are entirely creatures of 
statute.44 In the Newell case, the court stated that while the 
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions45 on the burden of 
proof for medical malpractice is correct, it should be 
preceded with a traditional instruction on plaintitrs burden 
of proof upon request.46 
B. First-Level v. Second-Level Fact Finding 
A Master makes "fll'St-level fact fmdings" which must 
be accepted by the trial court if there was credible evidence 
before the Master from which reasonable inferences could 
be made supporting the Master's fmdings.47 For example, 
if there is evidence of different amounts as to a party's 
earnings, the Master's fmding of any specific amount, 
supported by credible evidence, is binding on the trial court. 
However, the conclusions and recommendations drawn 
from these facts, i.e., second level facts, by the Master must 
be determined by the trial court using its own discretion 
without reliance on the Master's findings.48 For example, 
the specific amount of alimony recommended by a Master 
would be a second level fact fmding. The trial judge reviews 
that finding, using his or her own discretion which might, 
but not necessarily, be the same conclusion as reached by 
the Master.49 
C. Clearly Erroneous 
The clearly erroneous standard applies to review of a 
Chancellor's factual findings. 50 While the rule can be 
simply stated: an appellate court cannot set aside factual 
fmdings unless they are clearly erroneous,51 the court of 
special appeals has added a twist to that burden of persua-
sion in a recent case by creating a threshold test. 
That test provides that the limits on the trial court's 
discretion will ''he narrow" when consequences of a par-
ticular exercise of discretion are clear. For example, when 
one result is clearly just and the other clearly unjust. 
However, where there is no clear just or unjust result, the 
trial court will have broad latitude in its use of discretion. 52 
A threshold test must now be satisfied before an appellate 
court can review and decide if a trial court's decision is 
clearly erroneous. That question is: are the consequences 
clearly, or unclearly, just or unjust? Presumably, there 
would not be a dissenting opinion to an appellate answer to 
this threshold question. 
III. BURDEN APPLICATION PROBLEMS 
In Harris v. State,53 the court stated that ''the choice of 
a particular burden of persuasion is the way in which the law 
sends the message to the fact finder that with respect to a 
given issue, he should be persuaded a little bit, a lot, or 
something in between.'tS4 As simple as this sounds, courts 
are continually faced with the problem ofwhether the fact 
finder has used the proper degree of persuasion. TheHarris 
court continued with an explanation of the function of the 
burden of persuasion in a case: 
All the fact finder has acquired is a belief of what 
probably happened The intensity of this belief -
the degree to which a fact finder is convinced that 
a given act actually occurred - can, of course, vary 
.... Although the phrases ''preponderance of the 
evidence" and ''proof beyond a reasonable doubf' 
are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate 
to the finder of fact different notions concerning 
the degree of confidence he is expected to have in 
the correctness of his factual conclusions.5s 
A. Preponderance Of The Evidence. 
There is a little difficulty in applying this burden which 
is often defined as ''more likely than not." This is the burden 
upon which most court decisions are based The difficulty 
comes in applying those burdens which call for a lesser 
degree of proof, such as "reasonably possible" and ''prob-
able cause." Maryland courts have stated that "reasonably 
satisfied" is no more stringent a standard than ''preponder-
ance;"56 and that "[a] 'reasonable probability' is a probabil-
ity sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. "S7 
There seems to be little consistency among the various 
lesser burdens used. 
1. Reasonable Satisfaction 
"Reasonable satisfaction" is the standard applicable in a 
violation of probation proceeding. 58 This standard is actu-
ally the same as preponderance of the evidence. In Winkv. 
State,S9 the court of appeals addressed the appellant's con-
tention that the trial court applied the wrong standard of 
proof in a revocation of probation hearing.6O Appellant 
claimed that the court used the ''preponderance of the 
evidence" standard instead of the "reasonable certainty" 
standard, which he believed was a higher degree ofproof.61 
The court, relying in part on case law from other jurisdic-
tions, determined that "reasonable satisfaction" is actually 
a preponderance of the evidence.62 In addition, the court 
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stated, ''tracking the origin and use of reasonable satisfac-
tion in our cases demonstrates that the expression does not 
connote a different standard from preponderance on a fact 
fmding issue.'>63 Consequently, in violation of probation 
proceedings, the state needs to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a violation occurred in order to have a 
defendant's probation revoked.64 
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence 
. A number of problems have arisen in the proper appli-
cation of this burden. & recently as 1986, the court of 
appeals stated that the proper burden of persuasion to 
establish fraud was "satisfactorily convincing evidence.'>6S 
Two years later, a trial judge erroneously equated the clear 
and convincing standard with proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 66 It is generally believed that the clear and convinc-
ing standard exists somewhere between a preponderance of 
the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It 
appears that clear and convincing can best be defined by 
comparison - more than preponderance, but less than rea-
sonable doubt. 
C. Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Proof of guilt beyond all doubt has never been required 
in Maryland, even in the most serious criminal cases.67 In 
Collins v. State,68 the defendant argued on appeal that the 
trial court's jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt was 
misleading and lowered the burden of proof. In its instruc-
tion, the court stated: "In other words, you must be reason-
ably certain ofthe guilt ofthe accused in order to convict. '>69 
Defense counsel objected at trial to this phrase and the court 
then reinstructed the jury that the burden to prove murder is 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals in affirm-
ingthe trial court found that when the trial court reinstructed 
as to the burden, it more than adequately explained the 
beyond a reasonable doubt burden. 70 
In Montgomery v. State,71 the court stated that "even 
judges have problems construing the term reasonable doubt 
and that laymen are at least as likely to misconstrue the 
term.'>72 The court also stated that: ''the term reasonable 
doubt' is not so commonplac~, simple and clear that its 
meaning is self-evident to the jury."73 
In Laster v. State,'4 the defendant objected to the trial 
court's instruction on the reasonable doubt standard, saying 
it "could only . . . confuse and mislead the jury . . ." The 
trial court instructed, in part, as follows: 
Now, when we say beyond a reasonable doubt, are 
we telling you that the State has to prove it more 
than a reasonable doubt or beyond a reasonable 
doubt or further than a reasonable doubt? That's 
ridiculous. & I said, it's a term ofart and what it 
means is that the State has to prove its case to the 
exclusion ofa reasonable doubt. Now, let me tell 
you what a reasonable doubt is not. It doesn't mean 
that you have to be a hundred percent convinced of 
the Defendant's guilt . . . A reasonable doubt is 
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just what it says, it's a doubt founded on reason. 
When you go back in the jury room you take your 
common sense with you.7S 
The court of special appeals noted that ''there is no particu-
lar litany a court must recite in defining reasonable doubt 
. . . in any event, we perceive no error.'''6 
One can see in the Laster jury instruction the results of 
an attempt by the court to define the beyond a reasonable 
doubt burden in lay terms. It also demonstrates how this and 
other burdens are terms of art which are likely to be applied 
differently by different people. 
IV. JUDICIAL SURVEY 
As I researched this article, I became curious about my 
colleagues' concepts ofthe burdens of persuasion. I asked 
them to complete a survey modelled on that used by 
Professor McCauliffin her research.77 The survey asked the 
judges to give a percentage value to each of nine phrases 
which describe various burdens faced by them. Space was 
provided for any written comments.78 Of the twenty-five 
judges on the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, fourteen 
judges responded to the survey. Of the fourteen who 
completed and returned the survey, eleven placed numerical 
values by each of the burdens, while the remaining three 
explained why they could not evaluate the burdens in 
percentages. One ofthe three simply stated: "I am unable 
to place numerical percentages by these concepts." The 
other two stated that they could not quantify the burdens 
and rnnked them in descending order from highest to lowest 
degree of certainty required. 
There was significant variety among the responses to the 
survey.79 As to the percentage value of ' 'preponderance of 
the evidence," responses were: 50-plus percent, 50.1 per-
cent, and 51 percent. Nine respondents agreed that prepon-
derance of the evidence was valued at just higher than 50 
percent. 80 Responses to "clear and convincing evidence" 
ranged from 60 percent to 85 percent, with the majority 
placing this burden at 75 percent. 81 The responses to 
''beyond a reasonable doubt" ranged from 65 percent to 100 
percent, with no more than two respondents agreeing on the 
value for this burden.82 The response to "clearly erroneous" 
was the largest spread, from a low of 0-0.1 percent to 
a high of90-plus percent.83 
Of particular interest was the comparison of the re-
sponse of 65 percent certainty for beyond a reasonable 
doubt with the response of 85 percent needed for clear and 
convincing. 
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTION 
The rationale for requiring different degrees of persua-
sion is traced to what degree society will tolerate the 
possibility of error. No more than a probability is required 
in a tort case, but substantially more probability is required 
when one's liberty or life is at stake. Society is more willing 
to tolerate innocent people bearing the cost of an automobile 
accident (if 51 percent probability is satisfactory, that 
means that a 49 percent possibility of error is acceptable) 
than it is to tolerate incarcerating innocent persons. 
For the fact finder, there oughtto be only two burdens of 
proof, preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reason-
able doubt. As evidenced by cases and judicial surveys, the 
clear and convincing standard is a happy medium that is 
neither happy nor medium. 
For appeals, there should be only a/actually based test; 
that of substantial evidence. The clearly erroneous rule is 
an awkward phrase. A conclusion is either erroneous or not. 
The modifier, "clearly" does nothing to this test but add a 
level of confusion. This is shown by the survey responses, 
ranging from less than one to more than ninety percent. 
In summary, the use of various burdens of persuasion 
ought to be streamlined. Justice requires consistency which 
can best be obtained by reducing the varieties of burdens of 
proof and making their definitions clear. (Not clear and 
convincing, nor clear beyond a reasonable doubt, just 
clear!) As to the lesser burdens, such as reasonable prob-
ability, etc., they are so hopelessly impossible to describe 
with any degree of precision, that they can only be under-
stood by reference to fact specific precedent. 
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doubt; probable cause to believe; reasonable cause to believe; 
reasonable suspicion; clear and convincing evidence; clearly 
erroneous; substantial evidence; preponderance of the evidence; 
and more probable than not. 
79Complete responses to the burdens "preponderance of the 
evidence," "clear and convincing evidence," and "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" are given in the notes to this section. A 
breakdown of all responses is given in Appendix B to this article. 
lIO'J'he other two responses could also be described as "just more 
than 50%" with responses of 55% and 60%. Actual breakdown 
of responses for "preponderance of the evidence": 50%+ - I, 
50.1% - 2, 50.1% - 6, 55% - 1,60% - I. 
8JActual responses: 60% - 2, 75% - 6, 75-80% - 1,85% - I, "not 
in terms of percentage" - I. 
82Actual responses: 65% - I, 75% - 2, 80% - 1,85% - 1,90%-
I, 90%+ - 1, 99% - I, 100% - 2, "not in terms of percentage" - I. 
"Actualresponses: 0.1-1%-1,60%-1,65%-1,70%-1,75% 
- 5, 90%+ - I. It is interesting to note that where there was 
consistency among the respondents, it was in rating "clearly 
erroneous" the same as "clear and convincing." This is either due 
to coincidence or to the fact that "clear" must mean, to the judges 
of this bench, "more than half but less than all". 
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